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The Colorado College, Colorado Springs
Abstract
The attempts to reform the Russian education system since the fall of communism have had very uneven
results. My research has led me to conclude that both Russian reformers and their international allies
miscalculated the degree to which professional activism or a nascent “civil society” would compensate
for the loss of state or public administration and financing after 1991. Assuming that the end of
“totalitarian” education would result in a flourishing of grass-roots “innovation”, reformers failed to
anticipate the deepening financial and administra tive crises in post communist education. These severe
crises, mitigated only in part by Western assistance, have resulted in the sharp degradation of the public
education systems and human resource capacities in Russia and the other newly independent states, and
directly threaten the future of democratic and market reform. It seems that both many Russian reformers
and their Western allies were guided more by idealized Western models than by an accurate sense of
Russian needs and capacities. My conclusions are that international assistance should be focused more
directly on helping to foster new professional networks that can better defend and retrain educators and
teachers; and also that we must better combine general educational research with area studies
knowledge to inform our cooperative efforts.
1 Introduction
The last ten years in Soviet and post-Soviet education have witnessed several of the more
dramatic developments in postwar education in the world. The first was the catastrophic
economic and administrative crisis that accompanied the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and
its “common educational space”, an unprecedented degradation of an already highly-
developed educational system. This has posed a unique analytical and policy-related
problem for those engaged in international cooperation for education development: they
must work with disintegrating and yet still powerful institutional structures and pro-
fessional practices, rather than “developing” them as was common in most postwar
international education assistance efforts. The second dramatic development was the
equally unprecedented level of international cooperation and assistance that has sought to
facilitate education reform. Western government agencies; multilateral institutions, most
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notably the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and the World Bank; private nonprofits, foundations and exchange
organizations, most notably the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations; as well as
individual universities, consortia and professional associations have all been engaged in an
extraordinary array of efforts to assist reform.
Several questions present themselves. Why did Russian reformers pursue the education
policies they did in the early 1990s, and with what effects? How did the broader political
and economic battles of the early 1990s shape the struggle over Russian education? How
did various Western influences and models shape that process? Why were Western models
that stressed Anglo-American “conservative” solutions (such as privatization and the use of
vouchers) chosen over more continental solutions that stressed labor market planning and
the state direction of reform? Why did all concerned seemingly fail to anticipate the
deepening financial and administrative crises that would soon dissipate the “innovation”
movement, and how have those crises shaped the subsequent reform agenda? What exactly
have the many bilateral and multilateral assistance efforts accomplished? Based upon our
evaluation of what has worked and what has not, how should we approach future
international cooperation?
I hasten to add that I have enormous admiration for the political courage and visionary
hopes of the Russian educational reformers, and for the dedication of their many
international partners. However, I am also convinced that unless we are frank with
ourselves and our Russian colleagues about what has worked and what has not, we will be
unable to sustain governmental and domestic support for further international assistance to
the cause of Russian education reform.
My fundamental argument is that both Russian and Western reformers failed to realize
just how deeply the Soviet Party-State had crippled the formation of autonomous
professional structures and practices in education, as in virtually all other spheres. The
Communist Party-State took upon itself the combined power of the modern administrative
state and of “scientific” or “professional” expertise (Engelstein 1991; Balzer 1996). There
is an anomalous element to understanding the nature of Soviet professionalization, in that
by virtually all accounts educators and teachers in Soviet society felt an enormous sense of
professional pride and commitment (Jones & Krause 1991). Yet Russian educators and
teachers did not control any of the elements generally considered necessary for
autonomous professional development, such as control over access to the profession,
training and retraining, accreditation, job placement, the terms of employment, or standards
in educational research and publishing. Furthermore, they proved woefully unable to
develop such autonomous associational structures when given the opportunity after 1990.
Given this, when the authority of the Party-State collapsed in 1990-1991, the Russian
Ministry of Education rapidly and chaotically “devolved” administrative, financial and
curricular responsibilities down to the regional and local levels. Both Russian reformers
and their Western allies simply assumed that, once freed from “totalitarian” control,
professional activism would somehow flourish and drive grass-roots reform. It was,
tragically, a common fallacy that a nascent “civil society” was simply waiting to spring to
life after the fall of communism. The result, as is now clear, was as much chaos, paralysis
and parochialism as a flourishing of professional activism. One could also argue that the
weakness of Soviet professionalization cut both ways and that it also prevented con-
servative forces from mobilizing effective resistance to the radical reformers. The result,
however, remains paralysis and systemic dysfunction in Russian public education.
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It seems that understandings about the role of the Communist Party-State in Soviet
education before 1991 were simplistic on all sides. Establishment and communist Soviet
educators saw it as unproblematic. The regime brought the people forth from darkness, and
provided the curricular rigor, bureaucratic discipline, funding, and integration with the
planned economy that made the Soviet educational system the finest in the world. Liberal
and radical analysts, both Soviet and Western, also saw it clearly. The Party-State imposed
the dead-hand of bureaucracy, ideological dogmatism, and narrow vocationalism that
stifled the aspirations and creativity of teachers and the public, and imposed a false equity
and uniformity at the expense of real excellence and pluralism. One can, of course, agree
with much of this latter position and yet still find it simplistic as an education policy for
the transition period.
2 The Ambiguities of Late Soviet Education Reform
The “innovation” movement of the late 1980s offered searing critiques of official Soviet
curricula, traditional instruction and bureaucratic administration. The reform movement
sought to return to the “child-centered” and developmental pedagogy of the 1920s, and to
liberate creative school directors, teachers and students. As the drive for democratization
and Western-style economic reform accelerated in the late 1980s, it seems that many
Russian and Western reformers failed to understand the possible tensions between
democratization and marketization. They simply assumed that moral outrage against
“totalitarian education” would translate into a willingness on the part of both educators and
the public to give up the stability and security, however conditional or limited, of Soviet
“socialist” education and social policy. There also seemed to be many who assumed that
there was a necessary analogy between radical economic and educational reform: that one
had to first act decisively to destroy the “command-administrative” system, and then
educational freedom and pluralism would naturally flourish. Yet no one seemed to
appreciate just how fragile the system of public education and social provision really was,
how unevenly developed, and how badly funded (on this, see, for example, Ligachev
1988). Most importantly, no one seemed to realize just how thoroughly and deliberately
the regime had crippled educational administrators’ and teachers’ ability to act as
autonomous professionals.
The education reform movement suffered a reverse in 1988, when the “innovators”
failed to win over the majority of the teachers at an all-Union Teachers’ Congress
(Materialy 1988). In an attempt to break free from the moribund official Trade Union of
Enlightenment, Higher Education and Science Workers, leading reformers attempted to
create an alternative Creative Union of Teachers (Deklaratsiia 1988; for an excellent
overview of this period, see Kerr 1990). This effort proved still-born because of internal
and personal conflicts, a lack of experience or interest in grass-roots organizing on the part
of the innovative teachers, and concerted official resistance. The reform movement then
received new impetus with the appointment of a renowned historian of education, Eduard
D. Dneprov, as Russian Minister of Education in 1990. Initially checked by more
conservative forces in the all-Union bureaucracy, Dneprov’s team assumed full sovereignty
over Russian education after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 (Dneprov, Lazarev &
Sobkin 1991; Dunstan 1992). Yet the overestimation of the capacity of the rank and file of
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educational administrators and teachers to respond to the demands of radical change would
prove to be a fatal weakness at the heart of all subsequent reform efforts.
3 Radical Education Reform in Russia, 1991-1992
One can discern similarities between the broader patterns of Russian political and
economic reform after 1991 and the politics of education. First, there was a common
inability or failure to develop a mass organizational base, whether in the form of stable
reformist political parties or new professional associations, and the reliance upon
“emergency” measures and executive fiat to try to force through reform. In 1992 and 1993
the bitterness of the subsequent conflicts and the increasing resistance of conservative
forces, whether in the Russian Supreme Soviet or the public education establishment,
provoked increasingly aggressive policies, particularly as regarded privatization, in an
effort to break up the opposition and make reform irreversible. One could also argue that
many reformers had an unrealistic sense of the degree to which international assistance
could support their efforts, and that this perhaps militated against compromise and long-
term constituency building, at least with the more moderate opposition. In their haste to
destroy the old regime before it could reassert itself, the reformers arguably failed to plan
adequately for the transition, and simply hoped in some utopian sense that new forces and
interests would arise to drive and sustain systemic reform.
The reforms initiated by Dneprov and his team at the Russian Ministry of Education
undeniably mark a new era in the history of Russian education. The reformers understood
that the education system had to change fundamentally to adapt to market forces and to
develop students’ capacity for independent decision making, critical thinking and
democratic citizenship. The reformers sought to break up the “totalitarian” bureaucracy and
to rapidly “de-monopolize” and decentralize administrative and curricular authority,
allowing regions, municipalities and individual institutions to set their own policies and
practices. Other important principles included the demilitarization and “de-politicization”
of education, especially the social sciences, and the “humanization” of instruction through
child-centered teaching and developmental learning. All of this necessarily entailed
differentiation, understood as a necessary condition for freedom and pluralism in education
(on all this, see most notably Dneprov 1991; Dneprov & Eklof 1993; Dneprov 1994; A.
Jones 1994; Dneprov 1996).
The Russian reformers understood the need to coordinate the Ministry’s reform efforts
with “civic” and grass-roots activists, but did not fully understand how weak the
“pedagogical movement” actually was, especially as the deepening economic crisis
scattered its energies (Shchedrovitskii 1996). It is also undeniable that while Dneprov
began with the forces of reform arrayed around him, his policies, his demanding and
allegedly autocratic style, and what many perceived as his exclusive Western contacts
alienated many of his original allies. In their defense, Dneprov and the reformers did face
bitter resistance and savage personal and political attacks from the old guard of Soviet
pedagogy, and it is understandable that they would avoid creating or empowering
professional associations or a new teachers union that could have better mobilized
resistance to radical reform. Yet in their failure to organize new, democratically-elected
and autonomous professional associations or a new teachers union committed to reform,
Dneprov and his allies at the Ministry found themselves increasingly isolated, and lacking
in the instruments necessary to defend, popularize and implement their policies.
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In response to this impasse, Dneprov and the reformers focused on three issues, all
enormously controversial: the development of alternative or “non-state” schools and
privatization; the codification of a new education law intended to make reform irreversible;
and the cultivation of international financial and technical assistance. All three were
integral to the original reform agenda, but took on particular uses and emphases during the
bitter conflicts of 1991 and 1992. Privatization was intended to break with the perceived
lowest-common-denominator leveling of the Soviet public education system, and was also
seen as an effort to revive the rigorous intellectual traditions of the Russian intelligentsia.
This was in part articulated as a Western-style drive for excellence and “choice”, and,
whatever the intentions of its authors, was often seen as exclusive and elitist by its
opponents and by much of the public. This movement culminated in provisions in the
Education Law of 1992 that guaranteed state support in the form of subsidies or vouchers
for all educational institutions, state and “non-state” alike, although the financial and
regulatory realities of this were far from clear. The reformers envisioned the drive for
pluralism and privatization as an effort to carve out enduring spaces for experimentation
and innovation, perhaps against the possibility of future official reaction.
A second priority for the reformers was the codification of a new education law that
would consolidate the new decentralized system and protect regional, institutional and
personal autonomy. The Education Law of 1992 gave state, municipal, private and
religious organizations the right to run educational institutions, and also legalized home
schooling, breaking the state monopoly on education established by the Communists in
1918 (Zakon 1992; see also the commentaries by De Groof 1993 and Glenn 1995). The
emphasis was to be on parental choice in type of institution, and on teacher and student
choice in curriculum and instruction. Henceforth education was to be divided between
federal, regional and local components, with the center of gravity shifted decisively away
from the Ministry and the state.
In part on principle, in part out of financial necessity, and in part to prevent a revanche
from the center, the Ministry under Dneprov also rapidly and chaotically devolved
administrative, financial and curricular responsibilities down to the regional and local
levels. To check these centrifugal tendencies, the Law ostensibly guaranteed citizens’
rights to education up to a “national minimum”, and established loose federal standards for
accreditation and certification. In a move dictated both by financial necessity and by the
desire to allow differentiation or “profiling” in upper secondary schooling, the Law
guaranteed full state support for compulsory education only to grade 9, or age 15. This
measure effectively abrogated the commitment to universal secondary education through
grade 11 established in the 1970s.
From one perspective, the institution of the education law was a tremendous
accomplishment in placing the Russian education system on new foundations. From
another viewpoint, the Law of 1992 was a public relations disaster and questionable
politics, inasmuch as it insisted on a “big bang” to force through reform. The rapid
devolution of responsibility exacerbated administrative and financial chaos that was
already severe due to hyper inflation. The reformers overestimated the capacity of local
officials and teachers to respond to the new demands placed upon them, and failed to
anticipate the public outrage at the abrogation of a fundamental tenet of the social contract.
Granted, Dneprov and the reformers were under enormous pressure from more powerful
interests in the Russian government pursuing radical economic reform. Yet the pursuit of
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excellence and efficiency at the expense of equity, however useful or necessary, outraged
their opponents and the public during a time of acute social distress.
4 The First Wave of International Assistance, 1991-1992
The reformers also sought to sustain the drive for radical change by cultivating inter-
national cooperation and assistance. 1992 witnessed several major bilateral and multilateral
initiatives, including the passage of the Freedom Support Act in the United States, which
authorized new funds for student and professional exchanges and created a clearinghouse
to coordinate and encourage private aid efforts (Compendium 1992). The German federal
and state governments expanded their existing study and exchange programs (see, for
example, Mitter 1994); and The Council of Europe launched a major effort to integrate the
new independent states into existing education exchanges, which was later expanded to
become TACIS, Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States. It also
established new initiatives on educational legislation, the development of new curricula
and textbooks, and the reform of teacher training and educational administration.
UNESCO, the OECD and numerous private foundations such as the Soros Foundation also
launched research and aid efforts (for an early overview, see Anweiler 1992).
These international efforts were clearly vital in sustaining the reform movement in
Russian education, and especially in ending the debilitating isolation of Russian educators
from the international research community. While this aid bolstered the embattled
reformers, might it have also subtly militated against compromise, at least with the more
moderate opposition? Could it have allowed the Russian reformers to fatally neglect the
constituency-building necessary for sustainable reform? Did it begin to create a “culture of
clientalism” that encouraged some Russian reformers to sleight moderate indigenous or
grass-roots alternatives in favor of ambitious international partnerships? Again, I do not
intend to fault the Western advisors’ commitment to pluralism and educational freedom,
but merely to question whether radical decentralization, vouchers and sweeping
privatization were the most appropriate models for Russian reform, given the very different
social, political and professional realities that continued to shape the Russian education
system.
Faced with mounting resistance from conservative educators and the rank and file of
the teachers, and beset by alleged corruption scandals involving his aides, Dneprov was
forced out of office in November of 1992. He then became education advisor to President
El’tsin, only to be sacrificed yet again after the rise of communist and nationalist forces in
the parliamentary elections in December of 1993. Dneprov remains active, and is one of
the leaders of the “radical” wing of the otherwise traditional Russian Academy of
Education.
5 Moderate Education Reform and Systemic Crisis, 1993-1996
In the aftermath of the fall of Dneprov, the staff of the Ministry struggled to formulate a
more moderate reform agenda, reflecting in part the cautious temperament of the new
Minister, Evgenii V. Tkachenko. In response to teachers’ strikes and the protests of
regional and local officials, the Ministry struggled to protect funding, yet was hobbled by
the fact that funding for education and social policy remained “residual” to all other
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budgetary priorities. The Ministry lacked the bureaucratic and political power to compel
the government to deliver even on its stated financial commitments. This was taking place
amid an unprecedented collapse of GDP and tax revenues. Furthermore, as many industrial
and other economic enterprises were chaotically privatized, they simply sloughed off their
commitments to provide financial support and property to public education and other social
services. While the principles of decentralization, diversity and autonomy were reaffirmed,
the post-Dneprov leadership at the Ministry also stressed the urgency of developing
compensatory mechanisms such as common national curricular standards and a unified
system of examinations, accreditation and licensing to offset the severe disorganization and
inequities that had arisen since 1991. Although it was unclear whether funding would be
available, there was at least a stated commitment to build up capacities in the locales by
using combined federal-regional stabilization and development funds. Again, however, this
initiative seemed to focus more on retraining education officials than on cultivating
autonomous professional or teachers’ associations. While seeking to foster adaptation to
the new labor market and to accommodate regional and local interests, the new guidelines
sought to maintain a common sense of Russian citizenship and equivalency for students to
move across and through the system (Tkachenko 1994; Ob itogakh 1995).
While efforts have been made to restore the directing role of the Ministry in reform,
earlier reform impulses have continued. For example, efforts continue to encourage critical
thinking in the new curricula, developmental instruction, a “de-ideologizing” of the social
sciences and humanities, and the “profiling” or differentiation of curriculum and
instruction (the latter beginning in 1993-1994 in upper secondary schooling, and partially
extended in 1995-1996 to elementary schooling). These measures are intended to prevent
the extremes of “esoteric” teaching that does not meet federal standards or does not allow
student mobility across or through the system, or of simply using the old methods and
textbooks, which are hopelessly out of date and ideologically pernicious. There has been
an extensive program of cooperation between the Ministry and the autonomous republics
and regions to develop national programs in education, and to implement education laws
that correspond to federal requirements and standards.
Consistent with this effort to correct the “excesses” of earlier reforms without reversing
them altogether, measures have also been taken to restore guaranteed rights to universal
secondary schooling, to hedge in the scope of privatization, and to restrict the role of
religion and especially of foreign religious organizations in Russian public schools. After a
storm of protest, the extremely controversial and unpopular provision of the 1992
Education Law requiring compulsory education only through grade 9 was rescinded in
1994. In the same year, the rights of parental choice and cautious privatization were
reconfirmed in other measures, albeit with certain limitations (Zakon 1994; Kontseptsiia
1994). Furthermore, it was stipulated that all “de-nationalized” institutions were to be
strictly non-commercial and non-profit. The Ministry, after initially welcoming Russian
and foreign religious organizations into the public schools in exchange for grants and
equipment, was then forced by public pressure to cancel several contracts with foreign
evangelical groups and to reassert secular principles in public education.
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6 The Expansion and Effects of International Assistance
1993 and 1994 also witnessed a massive expansion of international assistance to Russian
education. These included the rapidly expanding educational exchanges funded through the
U.S. government’s Freedom Support Act and the European Union’s TACIS program, as
well as sustained research and cooperation efforts, which were clearly intended to foster
the professionalization of educational administrators and researchers (for an overview, see
OECD 1994). The Council of Europe expanded its research seminars and training efforts
in minority, language and human rights education; the democratization and
decentralization of administration; and on curriculum development, especially in the
teaching of history (Council of Europe 1994a, 1994b; Leclercq 1994; Mitter 1995). All of
these efforts were joined together in 1994-1995 as the “Demosthenes ‘Bis’ Education”
Program. While undeniably very useful, one senses that the real goal of these efforts is
more to introduce the Russians to European standards than to examine the increasingly
complex if not chaotic Russian standards and practices in detail.
By far the largest direct effort to assist Russian education was launched by the Cultural
Initiative Foundation, the Russian branch of the New York-based Soros Foundations. The
two most important initiatives were the $100 million International Science Foundation
(ISF), which included support for science education through the International Soros
Science Education Project (ISSEP); and the $250 million “Transformation of the
Humanities and Social Science Project.” ISF/ISSEP and “Transformation” were intended
to pioneer models for the reform of Russian education in several ways. First, by directly
supporting promising students and teachers and innovative schools. Second, by running
open competitions for drafting new textbooks and curricula; then by publishing large
editions of the new textbooks and demonstrating them; and finally, by a massive program
of teacher retraining to use the new texts and instructional methods. There were also
parallel efforts to retrain school directors (Building 1994). These efforts were all intended
to create models and to cultivate new professional leaders that the Ministry could then
apply and deploy throughout the system.
Another intention of the vast Soros efforts was to pump large amounts of hard currency
quickly into Russian education, and the grant programs undeniably provided a vital lifeline
to many thousands of researchers, educators and teachers. And yet, the haste of the myriad
efforts meant that they were often eclectic, poorly organized, wastefully funded, and badly
coordinated with other international assistance. In 1994, audits revealed financial
irregularities at the Cultural Initiative (Soros) Foundation in Moscow, and the Foundation’s
accounts and programs were frozen. The Soros office in Moscow was subsequently
reorganized and relaunched, yet “Transformation” had nonetheless wound down, and it
seems that only about a quarter of the funding committed was actually spent in Russia. The
most tangible legacy of Transformation is 25 new textbooks that are being produced in
editions of 1 million each, and being sold at cost to Russian schools. The Soros Foundation
is now committed to a new $100 million initiative to create a modern telecommunications
network for Russian education, and then using the 32 new University Internet Centers
(UICs) as the engines of systemic reform in Russian higher education and research.
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7 The World Bank Report on Russian Education, 1995
There are also two other major international efforts underway: a detailed OECD survey,
and a research and assistance program developed by the World Bank. The World Bank
report on Russian education issued in late 1995 is notable for its rethinking of some of the
Bank’s usual approaches to systemic reform such as the use of vouchers and privatization
(Heyneman 1995b; see also Heyneman 1994, 1995a; for an overview of the Bank’s role in
international educational development, see Ph. Jones 1992). The fundamental premises of
the Bank report are that Russian administrators, educators and teachers must be willing to
reform their institutions and practices to respond to the new labor markets and to improve
internal efficiency. Given that, the Russian government as a whole, and especially the
Ministry of Finance, must be willing to provide the financial resources to support those
reforms. Furthermore, the international community must be willing to contribute its advice,
technical assistance and, of course, development loans. This latter part of the agenda
remains problematic given the seeming lack of interest on the part of the Russian
government, and especially of the Ministry of Finance, in assuming such loan obligations.
Proposed measures include emergency financing to protect preschool and compulsory
education and ease the social costs of transition; adapting obsolete institutions and
curricula to the new labor markets, and shifting away from the scientism and narrow
vocationalism of traditional Soviet curricula; downsizing inflated pedagogical staffs;
fostering responsible and effective decentralization through the development of regional
and local management and financing; forging greater coherence between federal, regional
and local functions and policies; leveraging federal funds to ensure relative equality of
educational opportunity; establishing a national and meritocratic examination system;
opening up and privatizing educational publishing; renewing and reforming vocational
education by means of consumer and employer demand; and reforming teacher training by
moving it out of the grossly-underfunded pedagogical institutes and into the state
universities and the mainstream of the subject disciplines. Overall, the role of the federal
government would shift from direct financing and bureaucratic control to “quality
assurance and equality monitoring”. Furthermore, new central agencies for testing,
gathering statistics and licensing teachers would be needed.
While many of these proposals are undeniably necessary or at least inevitable, I would
nonetheless argue that there are several serious analytical and interpretive problems with
the Bank report. These problems are arguably typical of those that have plagued
international assistance to Russian education as a whole, the persistent blurring between
Western models and Russian realities. Granted, the Bank report is intended merely as a
“starting point” for discussions between Russian specialists and the international
community. However, while Bank reports often suggest that they must be neutral about
“politics” and personalities, the authors of the report on Russia often seem to simply accept
the specific choices and policies pursued since the late 1980s as a given. There is a certain
irony in all this. Former Minister Dneprov justified his commitment to vouchers,
privatization and radical decentralization in part by reference to earlier World Bank and
other Western studies (Dneprov 1996); while the Bank report suggests that the authors are
merely trying to make the best of a situation in which such policies are a given.
After laying out this ambitious agenda for systemic reform, the authors of the Bank
report arrive at several seemingly utopian conclusions. These proposals are unrealistic in
the sense that they often seem to consider human agency, in both the recent past and the
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near future, as essentially unproblematic. The report seems to suggest that if only the
correct framework for policy formulation and implementation can be forged, then all actors
will behave in an efficient, competent and honest manner. The most obvious problem with
this is that it rests upon the wildly unrealistic assumption that Russia in the late 1990s will
somehow rapidly become a “normal”, economically stable and law-governed state, with
reliable tax revenues and a functioning administration. The authors of the Bank report also
fail to directly address how these ambitious goals for financing and managing education
are being undercut by the ongoing economic crisis, and by the policies of uneven fiscal
austerity and structural adjustment being pursued, however fitfully, by the Russian
government.
Thus, while international assistance remains central to the future of Russian education
reform, the questions raised above about the coordination, sustainability and effects of such
cooperative efforts persist. Other threats include the refusal of Russian tax authorities to
exempt foreign aid foundations, and the effects of participation in cooperative programs
upon Russian educators and teachers in an increasingly nationalistic and xenophobic
political climate, particularly in the regions. There is also a clear pattern of donor
“burnout” and declining interest in the West, particularly in government-funded efforts.
8 Conclusions: Focusing the Agenda on Professional Development
All too often, when discussing the future of Russian education reform and shaping an
agenda for international cooperation, Russian reformers and their Western allies simply
return to the same hopeful assumption: if educational administration, finance and research
can only be successfully decentralized and made more efficient, then regional and local
officials and educators will rise to the occasion in a responsible and highly professional
manner. Or, if small groups of administrators, educators and teachers can be involved in
joint seminars, exchanges or research projects, then their insights and new practices will
somehow be transmitted to others throughout the system. However, again, I would caution
that the well-developed, autonomous professional associations and practices that must exist
to guide and realize these processes of transformation and decentralization remain fatally
weak and underdeveloped. This fundamental weakness of professional and associational
structures virtually guarantees that further decentralization will not result in
democratization and educational pluralism, but will only deepen the already severe
paralysis and inequality and lead to the impoverishment – and possible collapse – of the
Russian public education system.
Looking back over the last five years, an overarching conceptual and strategic error in
Russian education reform becomes apparent. By allowing the energies of reform to
fragment into private, alternative, religious and ethnic schooling, reformers failed to anti-
cipate that they would also shatter the public consensus for the taxation and commitment
required to rebuild the public education system. It seems that both many Russian reformers
and their international allies were guided more by idealized Western models and practices
than by the more prosaic needs and realities of Russian teachers and students. These errors
were compounded by the failure to use state or ministerial power to help forge new
professional associations and a new, democratically-elected teachers union, instruments
that were absolutely necessary to guide decentralization and democratization, and that
could have sustained reform after the inevitable waning of central initiative and financing.
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Furthermore, we must also ask ourselves some hard questions about our own efforts.
How, specifically, has international assistance shaped and furthered Russian education
reform? How well-informed are our efforts? What exactly can be done to improve the
research base and access to detailed institutional and regional data? Here I would argue
very forcefully for a more systematic effort to combine general Western educational
research with detailed area studies knowledge, and for the expansion of comparative
education research on Russia and the other Soviet successor states. There are very rich
traditions of German and British research on communist and especially Soviet education,
although those programs must be sustained and expanded (for an earlier overview of
German research, see Horner 1993). Many of the recent international efforts have been led
or shaped by educators who are experts in their countries, but who neither read Russian
nor possess detailed knowledge of Soviet or Russian education. While drawing upon
American and European experience is vital, we must also work to encourage detailed
research and statistical compilations in Russia, and then better use that knowledge to
inform our assistance.
Beyond such questions about the quality of our data, what exactly are the educational
values and policy goals that will drive and inform our efforts? Are we to encourage the
cultivation of elite schools and excellence at the expense of social equity? How might we
address the sharpening disparities in educational access and funding by region, ethnicity,
class and gender? To begin with, I would suggest targeting expanded international
assistance much more directly on professional development, most notably the training and
retraining of educational administrators, teacher educators, school directors and leading
methodologists in teaching. We may not always approve of the agendas that emerge from
these new professional networks, but we should accept them as necessary tools to stabilize
the profession and the public education system, and then do our best to keep their agendas
attuned to European standards. I hasten to add that I consider this advocacy of
professionalization as not simply another American model naively projected onto Russian
reality. Given the irreversible collapse of central financing and the consequent inability of
the Ministry to direct reform, such professional structures and networks are absolutely
necessary to prevent further parochialism, profiteering and systemic paralysis (for a
broader defense of professionalism as opposed to nakedly market-based or bureaucratic
authority, see also Friedson 1994). Lacking such professional organizations to defend
educators’ and teachers’ pay, pensions and working conditions, the reformers have lost
many of the best and brightest who could have been the leaders of a broad-based
professional reform movement, as they have scattered into isolated, and often failing
private institutions, or left the field altogether out of sheer economic desperation and
professional frustration.
The international community could work more systematically to encourage the
formation of enduring partnerships between Western professional associations, teachers’
unions and new Russian organizations, organized by subject discipline, function and
region. These new professional organizations could work to defend educators’ pay and
pensions, to evaluate the new curricula and texts, and to help popularize new approaches to
teaching and learning. Given the new regional focus in Russian politics, and the sharp
regional inequalities in financial and administrative capacities, national forms of such
professional organizations will also be absolutely vital to maintain the coherence and
integrity of the Russian public education system.
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There are several promising initiatives in Russia along these lines, such as the
Association for International Education, dedicated to fostering distance learning; the
Association of Civic Educators led by Petr Polozhevets and others, the Association for
Developmental Education led by Vasilli Davy’dov and Isak Froumin, and the Association
of Innovative Schools and Centers led by Anatolii Kasprzhak and Petr Shchedrovitskii. Yet
all of these new groups remain small and divided, and it is unlikely that such thematic
organizations will ever unite a broad cross-section of Russian educators.
In conclusion, the question remains: how best can Russian reform efforts be
encouraged and coordinated with international cooperation to build sustainable domestic
professional capacities and public constituencies, and thus allow education reform to
continue even after the loss of initiative from the central government and the waning of
international cooperation? This, and not the short-term or parochial interests of particular
institutions, partners or factions, must be our common agenda for the future.
Note
1 This research has been supported by the International Research and Exchanges Bo ard (IREX), the
ACTR/USIA research scholars program, the Harriman Institute of Colum bia University, and the
Colorado College. The author alone is responsible for the views expressed. A longer version of this
essay that also addresses the historical background to these issues is being published in the U.S.A. as
“Russian Education Reform in the 1990s”, The Harriman Review  (forthcoming); both essays are part of
a book-length research project on the legacy of Soviet education. This is only a prelimi nary study and
does not pretend to bibliographic coverage of the rich literature, especial ly in German and Russian, on
this topic. I wish to thank Gita Steiner-Khamsi, Leonard Benardo, and Steve Heyneman for their
comments, and Ulrike Scholl for providing me with documents from the Coun cil of Europe.
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